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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation,
Appellant,
CASE NO. 13798
vs.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body politic
and corporate, and DONALD A. CATRON,
an individual,
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a damage action brought by a registered securities
broker, First Equity Corporation ("First Equity"), a Florida
corporation, against Donald A. Catron ("Catron"), formerly the
Assistant Vice President of Finance of Utah State University, and
against Utah State University ("USU"), seeking recovery of commissions and other monies lost by First Equity as a direct consequence of USU's refusal to accept certain shares ordered by Catron
at a time when he was Assistant Vice President of Finance.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After substantial pleading, amendments to pleadings, and discovery, First Equity and USU filed opposing motions for summary
judgment which were argued before the Lower Court.

The Court

granted summary judgment in favor of USU and denied summary
judgment in favor of First Equity.

Catron1s defenses and counter-

claims were not involved in the opposing motions below, nor are
they involved in this appeal.

*

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment of the
Lower Court and judgment in its favor against USU.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. USU AUTHORIZED CATRON TO PURCHASE SECURITIES OF ANY
KIND THROUGH ANY BROKER WHO WAS A MEMBER OF ANY MAJOR SECURITIES
EXCHANGE OR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS.
USU is a corporate body politic whose rights and powers are
perpetuated by the Constitution of the State of Utah.

(Record

[hereinafter cited as "R."] at 203). Catron was employed by USU
on March 16, 1970, as a consultant to the retiring Controller.
(R. 29, 194, 200; Deposition of
"D."]f at 9).

Catron [hereinafter cited as

From July 1, 1970 until approximately January, 1972,

Catron served as Controller of USU.
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(R. 194-196, 212; D. 9-10).

While he was thus serving, the USU Institutional Council, a
council organized pursuant to 5B Utah Code Annotated §53-48-19
(1953) (hereinafter cited as "U.C.A."), adopted a formal investment policy establishing an Investment Committee and providing
for the appointment of Catron as "the University money manager
with authority to make investment decisions in keeping with
established policies and submit reports of performance and
portfolio investments at least monthly to the Investment Committee and quarterly to the Institutional Council.ff (R. 309, 314-16).
This policy was adopted on June 26, 1971, and represented only
one of five different resolutions containing similar authorizations
for Catron to invest the funds of USU. (R. 151). On January 20,
1972, the Institutional Council approved a corporate resolution
authorizing Dee A. Broadbent, ("Broadbent"), Vice President for
Business and Treasurer of USU, or Catron to act for USU in opening and maintaining:
. . . an account with any broker who is a
member of any of the major security exchanges
or the National Association of Security [sic]
Dealers for the purchase§ trade, and sale,
long or short, transfer, and assign [sic],
stocks, bonds, and securities of every nature
on margin or otherwise, and that any of the
officers hereinafter named be, and hereby is
authorized to give written or verbal instruction to the brokers concerning the herein
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named transactions; and he shall at all
times have authority in every way to bind
and obligate this corporation for the carrying out of any contract or transaction which
shall, for or on behalf of this corporation,
be entered into or made with or through the
brokers; and that the brokers are authorized ,
to receive from this corporation, checks and
drafts drawn upon the funds of this corpora, t
tion by any officer or employee of this corporation, and to apply the same to the credit
of this corporation or to its account with
said brokers: All confirmations, notices,
and demands upon this corporation may be delivered by the brokers verbally or in writing,
or by telegraph, or by telephone to any such
officer and he is authorized to empower any
person, or persons, that he deems proper, at
any time, or times, to do any and all things
that he is hereinbefore authorized to do.
That this resolution shall be and remain in
full force and effect until written notice
of the revocation hereof shall be delivered
to the brokers. [Emphasis added].
(R. 106, 137-38, 161-62).

.

2. PURSUANT TO HIS AUTHORITY, CATRON OPENED A SPECIAL
CASH ACCOUNT WITH FIRST EQUITY, A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, AND THROUGH THAT ACCOUNT,
CATRON ORDERED AND USU RECEIVED, ACCEPTED, AND PAID FOR CERTAIN
SECURITIES.
During the Winter of 1971-72 and while acting in his capacity
as "University money manager11, Catron attended a Florida investment seminar sponsored by First Equity, a securities broker registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers.
(R. 412; D. 21-23, 78-79).

Catron attended a similar seminar

sponsored by First Equity in approximately September,. 1972.

.4.

(D. 79-80, 93-95).

At these seminars, Catron met the officers

and agents of First Equity and was identified to them as the
"investment officer11 at USU.
(D. 22-23, 78-80).

His expenses were paid by USU.

Shortly after the second seminar, Catron

began purchasing shares on behalf of USU through a special cash
account with First Equity.

(R. 275, 298, 303; D. 93).

Although evidence with respect to the opening of the account
with First Equity is inconclusive as to the procedure followed
in that instance, the decision to open such an account was
generally transmitted by telephone to the broker.

(D. 81).

Catron presumed that his secretary or one of the part-time girls
would send authorizing resolutions to all of the brokerage firms
because that was standard procedure.

(D. 74-77, 82-84).

Although

Marcia Ann Beazer, Catronfs secretary, did not think that it was
"standard procedure11 to send out a copy of the January 20, 1972
corporate resolution to every broker, she conceded that it was
"possible" that she had sent a copy of the resolution to First
Equity. (R. 321). In any case, Catron indicated that he discussed his authority over the telephone with the broker and he
considered it a "mechanical" matter to send the form. (D. 74-75).
Between October 27, 1972, and February 28, 1973, Catron
ordered by telephone the purchase of the following corporate
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securities through First Equity:
Trade
Date

Company
Name

Number of
Shares

Price

Broker's
Commission

10-27-72

.Cunningham Arts

11,000

$129,437.50

12-22-72

Hughes Tool Co.

2,000

82.937.50

1-8-73

Fashion Fabrics

3,100

46,350.00

471.51

Fashion Fabrics

1,900

28,925.00

351.55

5,000

69,925.00

641.70

Advanced Memory Systems 5,000

111,250.00

807.00

1-9-73
1

1-12-73
*l-17-73

X

$1,119.75

-

Fashion Fabrics

1-23-73

A.T. & T. Co.

2,000

105,000.00

662.00

1-23-73

Ford Motor Co.

2,000

148,750.00

837.00

1-23-75

Taft Broadcasting Co.

2,000

95,787.50

621.15

24,100

289,200.00

2,282.80

Levitz Furniture Corp . 9,000

192,375.00

1,291.50

*l-31-73
1-31-73

Panelrama

1-31-73

National General

5,000

166,250.00

1,027.00

1-31-73

Health Industries

15,000

58,125.00

994.50

*2-28-73

Great Basins Petroleum 83,000

251,400.00

4,519.60

*2-28-73

Computing & Softwares 55,700

563,962.50

3,654.05

*2-28-73
2-28-73

Natomas Co.

13,000

728,000.00

2,677.70

Fashion Fabrics

51,600

445,050.00

3,423.15

(R. 99-149, 160-62; D. 80-81).

First Equity delivered certificates

for all of the shares listed above, except for those orders marked
by an asterisk, and USU received, accepted, and paid for them in
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full, including applicable commissions. (R. 1-20, 99-149, 160-62,
164).
3. CATRON ORDERED SECURITIES THROUGH FIRST EQUITY, A FLORIDA
BROKER, BECAUSE ITS DELIVERY TIME WAS SLOWER THAN OTHER BROKERS AND,
THEREFORE, USU WAS ABLE TO KEEP AND USE ITS FUNDS FOR A LONGER
PERIOD OF TIME.
On October 27, 1972, Catron placed an order with First Equity
to purchase 11,000 shares of Cunningham Arts on behalf of USU and
he instructed First Equity to make delivery against payment at
the First Security Bank in Logan, Utah. (R. 99-149, 160-62, 312-13).
First Equity purchased the shares on behalf of USU and caused certificates to be delivered to First Security Bank. A representative of the bank informed USU that the certificates had arrived
and delivered them to USU upon receipt of a check for the price
of the stock made payable to the bank. (R. 312-13).

Payment for

all of the 11,000 shares was not completed by USU until December
5, 1972, approximately thirty-nine days after the order was placed.
(R. 303).
When Catron became acquainted with the delays which were involved in obtaining delivery from and making payment to First
Equity, he increased his use of the brokerage firm.

He considered

the longer time periods a distinct advantage to USU because the
university could keep and use its funds for a longer period of
time. d(D. 118-19, 218-21).
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4. ON MARCH 19, 1973, USU REFUSED TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF
CERTAIN SECURITIES, WHICH HAD BEEN ORDERED BY CATRON ON BEHALF
OF USU, ON THE GROUNDS THAT CATRON HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER THEM.
Five of USU's orders, each of which is marked on the above
list by an asterisk, were not accepted by USU.

On March 13, 1973,

First Equity tendered delivery to USU of 3,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems, but USU refused payment. (R. 305, 307,
313).

At approximately the same time, delivery was tendered to

USU of sufficient shares to satisfy the other four outstanding
orders. (R. 313, 342). On March 19, 1973, First Equity was informed by USU that the university would not accept delivery with
respect to all five orders on the grounds that Catron was not
authorized to purchase securities on behalf of USU. (R. 196, 251).
Written confirmation of this was given to First Equity's Salt
Lake City attorney on March 22, 1973, by hand delivered letter
from Assistant Attorney General Mark A. Madsen ("Madsen11). (R.
330-31).
5. NOTICE OF A SECRET TERMINATION OF CATRONfS AUTHORITY
TO PURCHASE SECURITIES ON BEHALF OF USU WAS NOT GIVEN TO FIRST
EQUITY UNTIL AFTER FEBRUARY 28, 1973.
Catron was appointed "University money manager11 by the USU
Institutional Council on or about June 26, 1971, and he continued
to carry out the duties of that position until March 20, 1973,
when he was officially suspended* (R. 196, 212-13).
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As the investment officer of USU, Catron was invested with
"authority to make investment decisions in keeping with established policies11. (R. 309, 314-16).

The policy statement adopted by

the Institutional Council at the time Catron was appointed gave
him authority for the following three years (until June 26, 1974)
to "reinvest11 up to sixty percent (60%) of the funds that were
not needed for current purposes "to build up the investment pool
for long range objectives." (R. 315-16).
Approximately six months later, the Institutional Council
further authorized Catron and Broadbent, Catronfs immediate superior, to establish accounts with registered brokers for the
purchase of "stocks, bonds, and securities of every nature on
margin or otherwise".

The authorization was to "remain in full

force and effect until written notice [of a revocation was] delivered to the brokers." (R. 106, 137-58, 161-62).
First Equity received no notice of revocation until so
informed by telephone on March 19, 1973, and received no written
notice of revocation until March 22, 1973. (R. 196, 251, 330-31).
Thus, Catron1s investment duties and authority were officially
suspended and notice of the revocation of his authority was given
to First Equity some three weeks after February 28, 1973.
USU claims that Catron's authority to purchase common stock
was revoked beginning around December 4, 1972. (R. 152, 203, 359).
-9-

Whether or not this is true has no bearing on this appeal. USU
continued to receive, accept, pay for, and enjoy the benefits of
owning common stock ordered by Catron on behalf of USU until after
February 28, 1973. Every order placed with First Equity, other
than the first one, was communicated to First Equity on or after
December 22, 1972. (R. 99-149, 160-62, 164). As shown by the
• * • • . • . • ' ' •

~ v -

*

list of orders set forth hereinabove, USU received, accepted and
paid for $1,356,537.50 in common stock after the alleged secret
revocation.

Indeed, the February 28, 1973 order for 51,600

shares of Fashion Fabrics was received, accepted, and paid for
in full in the amount of $445,050.00 plus brokerfs commissions
in early March, 1973, approximately three months after the alleged secret revocation. (R. 99-149, 160-62).
6. FIRST EQUITY SUFFERED MONETARY DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF
USU'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT DELIVERY OF CERTAIN SECURITIES.
After USUfs refusal to accept delivery of the orders marked
by asterisks in the above list, First Equity and others effected
a cancellation of the transactions involved with respect to
these orders, except that of Advanced Memory Systems shares.
(R. 329, 350-51).

As a result of USUfs refusal to accept delivery

of all five orders, First Equity lost brokerage commissions in
the amount of $13,941.15. (R. 425). As a result of USU's refusal
*
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to accept delivery of Advanced Memory Systems shares, First
Equity suffered losses on the sale of those shares in the amount
of $37,045.27. (R. 248-49).
Upon USUfs refusal to pay for the losses incurred by First
Equity as a result of USUfs refusal to accept the shares, First
Equity filed a Complaint in the District Court of Cache County,
Utah, naming USU and Catron as the parties responsible for the
losses and seeking recovery of damages. (R. 1-20).

Cross Motions

for Summary Judgment were made by USU and First Equity based upon
the allegations in the Complaint. (R. 238-39, 433-34).

No motion

was filed by Catron.
Summary Judgment in favor of the university was granted on
the ground the 4A U.C.A. §33-1-1 prohibited USU from investing
any funds in common stock and, therefore, First Equityfs Complaint
failed to state a claim for relief which could be granted. (R. 435D).
First Equityfs Motion for Summary Judgment was denied on the
grounds that (1) USU had no statutory power to invest public funds
in common stock, (2) a triable issue of fact existed as to whether
non-public funds were available to purchase the common stock, and
(3) Regulation T, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board under
the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, constituted

a complete defense as to liability for damages arising out of
orders which had not been delivered within thirty-five days of
the trade date.

(R. 435B).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING USU'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE USU HAD POWER TO INVEST FUNDS IN ITS POSSESSION IN SECURITIES OTHER THAN THOSE ENUMERATED IN SECTION 33-1-1, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953).
A.

J

" "''

Reason for Appeal.

The Court below granted USU's Cross-Motion on the ground
that First Equity's claim was "barred by the provisions of the
Utah Code prohibiting the investment by state employees of funds
in their custody in securities other than those enumerated in
Utah Code §33-1-1." (R. 435D).

The Order of the Lower Court is ,

in error because USU had the power to invest in common stock as
part of its general power to control and supervise all appropriated and donated funds; to purchase, hold and sell all forms of
personal property; to invest and manage such property; and to
handle its own financial affairs.
,

.
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Statutory Authority to Invest0

In 1888, an Agricultural College and an Experiment Station
were created by the Territorial Legislature, and a governing
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Board of Trustees was established with the following duties and
powers:

o

They shall have the general control and supervision of the agricultural college, the farm
pertaining thereto, and such land as may be
vested in the college by Territorial legislation, of all appropriations made by the Territory for the support of the same, and also
of lands that may hereafter be donated by the
Territory . . . or by any person or corporation,
in trust for the promotion of agricultural and
industrial pursuits . . . . [Emphasis added].

COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH §1855(1888).
The authority so granted to generally control and supervise all
appropriations and private donations was clearly intended to
invest the College with broad discretion in handling its financial affairs.

This general authority to control and supervise

lands and appropriations was perpetuated in 1895 by Article X,
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
The location and establishment by existing
laws of the University of Utah, and the
Agricultural College are hereby confirmed,
and all the rights, immunities, franchises,
and endowments heretofore granted or conferred,
are hereby perpetuated unto said University
and Agricultural College respectively.
The structure of USU was revised in 1929 by the Utah
Legislature, changing its status to that of a

ff

body politic

and corporate11, but the Legislature expressly perpetuated in
the College "all rights, immunities, franchises and endowments"
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theretofore "granted or conferred11.

The statute further pro-

vided that USU:
. . . may have and use a corporate seal, may
sue and be sued and contract and be contracted
with. It may take, hold, lease, sell and convey
real and personal property as the interests of
the college may require. [Emphasis added].
5B U.C.A. §53-32-2.
The language here is extremely broad, with no indication that
the "property11 which may be taken, held, sold and conveyed is
exclusive of common stock.

Section 53-32-4 of the same Act

delineated the general "corporate powers of USU with respect to
the use of funds received by gift, grant, devise or bequest:
The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah
State University of Agriculture and Applied
Science] in its corporate capacity may take
by purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest
any property real or personal for the use of
any department of the college and for any purpose appropriate to the objects of the college.
It may convert property received by gift, grant,
devise or bequest and not suitable for its uses
into other property so available or into money.
Such property so received or converted shall
be held, invested and managed, and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the grant or donation . . . .
[Emphasis added].
5B U.C..A. §53-32-4.
In 1969, the Legislature reiterated the universityfs general
power to control and manage its finances in the Higher Education
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Act, 5B U.C.A. §53-48-1. et se£0

That Act did not limit or

narrow the universityfs existing general powers, but rather
indicated a broad discretion in the management of all funds;
Each university and college and the Utah
Technical College at Provo and the Utah
Technical College at Salt Lake City may
do its own purchasing, issue its own payrolls, and handle its own financial affairs
under the general supervision of the Board
as provided in this act. [Emphasis added] .
5B U.C.A. §53-48-10(5).
In addition, the 1969 Act specifies that:
Any institution, college or department or
its foundation or organization engaged in
a program authorized by the board [of Higher ...
Education] may:

(c) Accept contributions, grants or
gifts from any private organization. . . » .
(d) Retain, accumulate, invest» commit
and expend the funds and proceeds of such
authorized programs . . . . [Emphasis added].
5B U.C.A. §53-48-20(3).
The power to invest was expressly and explicitly granted with
respect to non-appropriated funds such as private contributions,
grants or gifts.

In addition, USU was expressly and explicitly

empowered to take any form of personal property by purchase, to
hold, and to sell that property as the interests of the college
may require.

These explicit powers and the other broad powers of
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USU to manage, control, and supervise its financial affairs
were established and perpetuated by early statutes and the Utah
Constitution.

They were recognized and continued by the 1969

Act, and were not abrogated until after the relevant events involved
in this case were completed.

See The State Money Management

Act of 1974, U.C.A. §51-7-1 et seq.(1974 Interim Supplement).
C.

Investment Activities of USU.

This Court has stated that legitimate sources of enlightenment as to legislative intent are the actions of those entities
which have the responsibility of conforming to the statutory
provision in question.

State Board of Education v. State Board

of Higher Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1113 (1973).

It

is certainly true that USU and other Utah universities have had
a long history of investing in common stock, which practice continued unchallenged until the events which precipitated this litigation.

The governing bodies and officers of the university

construed the existing statutory pattern as one permitting USU to
invest in common stock0

Indeed, it appears from the record that

no question as to the propriety, let alone the legality, of common stock purchases arose until the University Investment Program
began to show a substantial loss. (R. 212, 214). Even at the time
questions were raised by the university and its accountants, an
opinion from the Attorney Generalfs office indicated that USU

was empowered, at least, to invest "funds derived from grants,
gifts, devises or bequests in such securities or other property
as it deems fit or as the donor may specify.11 (R. 157, at 5 ) .
D.

The Proper Interpretation of Section 33-1-1.

USU argued below that the explicit Legislative grants of
power to purchase, hold and sell all forms of personal property,
to convert private donations into other forms of property, and
to invest such property, were insufficient to give USU the power
to invest in common stock. (R# 366-68).

By implication, USU

argued and the Lower Court ruled that any actions relating to
investment in common stock, carried out by the governing bodies
and officers of the university after the enactment of Section
33-1-1 of the Utah Code in 1939, were all ultra vires.
It is only upon such an erroneous interpretation of existing
statutory and constitutional language that USU is able to construct
-its primary theory that Section 33-1-1 is an enabling statute
without which no power exists to invest any funds whatsoever in
any form of securities.

That is, until 1939, when the statute was

passed, none of the persons or organizations listed in the statute
could legally invest in any form of securities.

USU1s secondary

theory appears to be that Section 33-1-1 is a prohibitory statute
which restricts previously held powers of investment to the power
to invest only in the securities listed in Section 33-1-1.

-17-

The

Court below appears to have adopted this latter theory. (R. 435D).
Because the proper interpretation of this statute is so
significant to this appeal, it is set forth in its entirety:
Investments in certain securities declared
lawful. On and after the passage of this
act investment by receivers, insurance companies of whatever type or nature, building
and loan associations, savings and loan
associations and other financial institutions, charitable, educational, eleemosynary
>
and public corporations and organizations,
_ municipalities and other public corporations
1 .
and bodies, mutual assessment insurance companies, mutual benevolent and benefit associations; or investment of funds of any state
insurance fund, state sinking fund, state
bs.vv
school fund, firemen's relief and pension
fund, police pension fund, or other pension
.
fund; or investment by any administrative
department, board, commission or officer of
r ? iri
the state government, and of any county
government, authorized by law to make investJ £
ments of funds in the custody or under the
control of such department, board, commission, r
or officer, school district or township, or.
the investment by any private, political, or
public instrumentality, body, corporation or
,-.-.:: person of their own funds or funds in their
-^^possession in bonds and other obligations of
or bonds or obligations guaranteed as to
interest and principal by the United States;
bonds or debentures issued by any federal
n,
home loan bank in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act
i ?
^
as now or hereafter amended; consolidated
,r
federal home loan bank bonds or debentures
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
in accordance with the provisions of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act as now or hereafter
amended; farm loan bonds, consolidated farm
loan bonds, debentures, consolidated deben-
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^

r

tures and other obligations issued by fed- „/ . .-.
eral land banks and federal intermediate
credit banks under the authority of the
Federal Farm Loan Act approved July 17, 1916,
as now or hereafter amended (Title 12, U.S.C.
Sections 636-1012 and sections 1021-1129),
and the bonds, debentures, consolidated
debentures and other obligations issued by
banks for co-operatives under the authority
of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, as now or
hereafter amended (Title 12 U.S.C., Sections
1131-1138f); bonds or debentures issued by
the federal savings and loan insurance corporation in accordance with the provisions
of Title IV of the National Housing Act as
now or hereafter amended; in shares or accounts of building and loan associations
i
which have been insured by the federal savings and loan insurance corporation and
shares or accounts of federal savings and
loan associations incorporated under* the
'"'
1
provisions of the Home Owners Loan Act of
1933 as now or hereafter amended; which have
been insured by the federal savings and loan
insurance corporation to the extent to which
the withdrawal or repurchasable value of
such shares or accounts now are or may here_
after be insured by the federal savings
and loan insurance corporation under the Acts .„,,
of Congress of the United States of America
now in effect or which may hereafter be en:;v
acted, shall be lawful0 [Emphasis added] .

4A U.C.A. §33-1-1.
The following significant points about this section must
be emphasized.

First, the statute consists of one declaratory

sentence, the basic structure of which is as follows:

"[Invest-

ment by [named parties] of their own funds or funds in their
possession in [specified securities] shall be lawful.11 USUfs
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interpretation of the statute is the negative implication of
this declaration, to wit:

"investment by the named parties of

their own funds or funds in their possession in other than specified securities shall be unlawful,"
Second, the statute expressly refers to

f,

any private, politi-

cal or public . . . corporation or person" and its provisions
and meaning must be equally applied to private corporations and
person.

If it is to be construed as USU contended below, and as

the Lower Court held, such persons would be prohibited thereby
from investment of their funds in any but the enumerated securities.
That such was the legislative intent of Section 33-1-1 is manifestly
absurd.

. * ''

t

Third, if Section 33-1-1 is to be regarded as an enabling
statute, constituting the source of investment authority available
to the university and other persons subject to its provisions,
what is to be made of the express direction of the Legislature ten
years earlier that USUfs property "shall be held, invested and
managed, and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed"?

See

5B U.C.A. §53-32-4. USUfs theory makes the 1929 legislative
mandate mere surplusage.
Fourth, the statute itself refers to "investment by any . . .
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board . . . or officer of the state government, authorized by
law to make investments of funds in the custody or under the <
control of such . . . board . . • or officer . . . .,f This
wording contemplates other authorizing or enabling laws and regulations; it does not authorize USUfs board of trustees to make
investments through legally appointed officers, it merely

recog-

nizes that certain state boards and officers have such authority.
Section 33-1-1 does not create new powers.
Fifth, it must be considered whether Section 33-1-1 is a
prohibitory statute, one which limits previously authorized
investment powers. The Lower Court adopted this interpretation.
(R. 435D).

Such an interpretation is, of course, based upon the

premise that such powers have been previously granted.

The statute

is noticeably free from specific prohibitive language such as
would be necessary to terminate previously existing powers.
Furthermore, the prohibition would have to apply to. private persons
and corporations as well as to USU and it is clear that investments
by private persons in securities other than those listed in Section
33-1-1 have not been prohibited or declared unlawful by the Utah
Legislature. To argue that Section 33-1-1 is a prohibitory statute
is, again, manifestly absurd.
.

The proper interpretation of Section 33-1-1 is very simple.

Without prohibiting any other investments or requiring only the
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listed investments, the Legislature declared that certain investments were lawful. As Section 33-1-3 states, "The provisions of
this act [including Section 33-1-1] are supplemental to any and
all other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal investments . . . .fl Lists of legal investments "tend to give help
to trustees in selecting investments and work in the direction
of certainty as to investment duties".
LAW OF TRUSTS 420 (3d ed. 1952).

G. BOGURT, HANDBOOK OF THE

A trustee, such as a "University

money manager" administering the monies placed in his custody, who
buys securities on the legal list will "in all probability be

^

protected against any claim of breach of trust; but following the
legal list does not absolutely insure protection to the trustee
against liability." J|d. A trustee must always use reasonable
care in following a list of legal investments.
E.

Id., at 421.

Proper Governance of State Investments.

rr

:

The major argument raised by USU against this straight-forward—
interpretation of Section 33-1-1 is that it leads to a situation
in which funds in the university1s custody could be invested in
"anything", including speculative securities.

That argument, of

course, ignores the strict duties and obligations imposed upon
public officers by the common law.

See generally 63 Am Jur 2d,

Public Officers and Employees, §§ 328-29.

Nevertheless, it must

be acknowledged that the concern is legitimate in light of the
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broad investment powers, as to both appropriated and nonappropriated funds, which were possessed by the university.
In State of Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. H94,812 (D. Utah, October 1, 1974), Judge
Anderson commented on this very problem:
The court has serious concerns with plaintiffs1
theory that the University does not have power
to invest in common stocks for it does not appear that the Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 (1966) is
an enabling statute which clearly sets forth
the investment guidelines for state universities. The court is equally concerned with . . .
the theory that would give state universities
a free hand in all investment matters.
Id., at 96,716.
An identical concern on the part of the Utah Legislature
is evidenced by its passage of the State Money Management Act
of 1974, U.C.A. §51-7-1 et se£.

(1974 Interim Supplement),

which for the very first time establishes legislative limits to
the universityfs discretion.

Several of that Act's provisions

make it clear that Section 33-1-1 is not to be construed as USU
argued below.

The Actfs purposes were set forth as follows:

Purpose of act. (1) The purpose of
this act is to secure the maximum public
benefit from the deposit and investment
of public funds, and, in furtherance of
such purpose:
(a) To safeguard and protect deposits
of public funds by providing qualifications
for depositories of these funds;
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(b) To establish and maintain a
continuing statewide policy for the
deposit and investment of public funds;

-

(c) To establish a system of centralized investment for state money and
to authorize public treasurers to invest
public funds either under the state policy
or through centralized state management
of pooled investment funds; and
(d) To establish minimum requirements for bonding of public treasurers.
(2) The legislature finds that the
objectives of this act will best be obtained through improved money management,
emphasizing the primary requirements of
safety and liquidity and recognizing the
different investment objectives of operating and permanent funds and the importance of investing public funds within
the state so as to promote the economic
welfare of the entire state.

If, as was argued below, the Legislature had enacted a continuing
statewide investment policy through Section 33-1-1, the Legislature
had no need to "establish" such a policy in 1974.

It is clear

that the Legislature did not regard Section 33-1-1 as being in
any sense prohibitive or comprehensive in its application to the
public funds, the disposition of which the Legislature undertook
to regulate and circumscribe in the 1974 Act.

If Section 33-1-1

had been regarded as an enabling or prohibitive statute, its repeal
would have been necessary, as was the repeal of a number of other
regulatory sections.

Section 33-1-1 has not been repealed.

See

Repealing Clause, State Money Management Act of 1974, LAWS 1974,

ch. 27, §39. The legal list contained in Section 33-1-1 has
been declared no longer applicable to investments of public
funds, U.C.A. §51-7-21 (1974 Interim Supplement), but it has
been replaced by more comprehensive legal lists, U.C.A. §§ 517-11 and 12 (1974 Interim Supplement), by a "prudent man11
rule applicable to investments of certian non-appropriated funds
of member institutions of the state system of higher education,
U.C.A. §51-7-14 (1974 Interim Supplement), and by a five part
list of criteria to be used by all public treasurers in making
deposits and investments of all public funds. U.C.A. §51-7-17
(1974 Interim Supplement).

Interestingly, funds acquired by gift,

devise, or bequest or private grant may still be invested in
common stock, although the Legislature has specified criteria
to be used in determining the kinds of private corporations in
which the university may invest. U.C.A. §§51-7-12 and 13 (1974
Interim Supplement). All these additions to Utah statutory law
make clear the fact that Section 33-1-1 was enacted as a legal
list to declare presumptively legal investments for persons entrusted with investment responsibilities.
First Equity is in agreement with the point made by USU
before the Court below, that the university is "subject to the
control of the Legislature", (R. 367), and First Equity does not
contend that Article X, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution places
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the university outside that control.

First Equity argues, however,

that at the time of the transactions in question, legislative
control expressly allowed the purchase of common stock with funds
in the universityfs custody.

Public officers "purchased such sec-

urities at the risk of having to indemnify the public, but they
were authorized to so invest the funds in their custody. Appellant urges, furthermore, that the concern referred to above has
its proper forum in the Legislature, where it appears to have
been heard, and that it does not at this time constitute an appropriate argument before this Court.
The issue before this Court is whether the above delineated
statutory scheme permitted USU, at the time of the transactions
involved in this litigation, to purchase common stock, with either
public or non-appropriated funds. A determination that either
alternative is possible under the statutes involved will require
that the Order below granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment be reversed.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING USUfS CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE COURT DETERMINED THAT USU HAD POWER TO
INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DEVELOPMENT
CONTRACTS.
A.

Reasons for Appeal.

The Memorandum Decision of the Court below states equivocally
that Section 33-1-1 bars USUfs investment of funds in its custody

in common stock, "with the possible exception of funds received
by the institution from individual grants or development
contracts11. (R. 258). Thus, in denying First Equityfs motion,
the Lower Court stated that there was
a triable issue of fact whether USU, at
the time Catron ordered the stock in question or the time payment for said stock
fell due, had funds which it had received
from individual grants or development contracts sufficient to pay for part or all
of said stock . . . .

~

(R. 435B).
The Court below could have determined that a triable issue of
fact existed only if it had first determined that certain nonappropriated funds could lawfully be invested in common stock.
Therefore, Appellant submits that the Lower Court erred in granting USU's Cross-Motion on the basis that no funds in the custody
of the university could be invested in common stock.
B.

Authority to Invest Non-Appropriated Funds.

In 1929 and again in 1969, the Utah Legislature explicitly
stated that USU could invest funds received as contributions,
grants, gifts, devises, or bequests. See 5B U.C.A. §§ 53-32-4
and 53-48-20(3) (quoted above in relevant part)e

On December

15, 1972, the office of the Attorney General issued an opinion
letter to the State Auditor informing him that USU had authority
"to invest funds derived from grants, gifts, devises or bequests
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in such securities or other property as it deems fit or as the
donor may specify.11 [Emphasis added]. (R. 157, at 5)* At the
time of the transactions involved in this litigation, USU
allegedly was operating or was supposed to be operating on the
basis of that opinion. (R. 215-17).
C.

Contradictory Orders Below.

In granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court below stated that First Equity's claim was

ff

barred by the

provisions of the Utah Code prohibiting the investment by state
employees of funds in their custody in securities other than thos
enumerated in Utah Code §33-1-1." (R. 435D).

The obvious meaning

of this Order is that no funds in the custody of USU may be invested in common stock.

The Lower Court also concluded that

certain non-appropriated funds could be invested in common stock,
based upon Sections 53-48-10(5) and 53-48-20(3) of the Utah
Code. (R. 258). Appellant agrees entirely with that portion of
the Lower Court's decision which concludes that USU had the
power to invest non-appropriated funds; however, appellant disagrees with the way the Lower Court ignored that part of its own
conclusion in granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, First Equity petitions this Court to affirm the conclusion of the Lower Court that non-appropriated funds in the
custody of USU could have been invested in common stock and to

t
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reverse the Order granting USUfs Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WAS RAISED
BY THE CONCLUSION THAT USU COULD INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM
INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS.
A.

Reason for Appeal.

The Lower Court denied First Equity's Motion for Summary
Judgment because it concluded that an issue of fact was raised
as to whether sufficient non-appropriated funds were available
for USU to purchase the common stock. (R. 435B).

First Equity

contends that this conclusion is erroneous because whether
such funds were available is not a relevant issue.
Whether or not USU had sufficient authorized funds to purchase the shares is irrelevant to the question of whether First
Equity is entitled to compensation, unless the Court assumes
that the agent of a governmental body is on constructive notice
that his contract is ultra vires any time the governmental body
does not have sufficient authorized funds to meet its contract
obligations.
B.
*

Such a proposition is untenable.

First Equity was the Agent of USU.

The transactions involved in this litigation were unsolicited

orders placed by USU with First Equity and First Equity's duty was
to purchase shares of stock, as a broker, for the account of USU
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and to tender delivery of the certificates to USU. (R. 99-149,
160-62, 312-13),

A broker has been defined as n[a]n agent em-

ployed to make bargains and contracts for compensation.11 [Emphasis added].

BLACK1S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (4th ed. 1951). Stock

brokers have been defined as

lf

[b]rokers employed to buy and sell

for their principals stocks, bonds, government securities, etc.11
[Emphasis added].

JEd., at 242. Article I, Section 3(a) of the

By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers states,
in pertinent part, that a broker is "any individual, corporation
.

# #

or other legal entity engaged in the business of effecting

transactions in securities for the account of others . . . .fI
[Emphasis added].

See N.A.S.D. By-Laws, Art. I, §3(a) CCH N.A.S.D.

MANUAL K1103. According to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 7B
U.C.A. §70A-8-303, a broker is "a person engaged for all or part of
his time in the business of buying and selling securities, who in
the transaction concerned acts for, or buys a security from or
sells a security to a customer." [Emphasis added].

Thus, in per-

forming its contractual duties to purchase stock, First Equity was
clearly the agent of USU.
C.

• .,

Performance by First Equity,,

*---. .v

USU, through its Assistant Vice President of Finance, entered
into the five oral contracts involved in this litigation, under
which First Equity was to purchase certain shares of common stock
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and deliver them to USU.

All five purchases were consummated and

notice thereof was sent to USU. (R. 99-149, 160-62).

First Equity

did everything necessary to cause delivery to be made as USU
had directed.

On March 13, 1973, delivery of certificates repre-

senting 3,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems was tendered to USU,
but payment was refused. (R# 305, 307, 313). At approximately the
same time, delivery was tendered to USU of sufficient shares to
completely satisfy the other four outstanding orders. (R. 313, 342).
On March 19, 1973, USU informed First Equity that the university
would not accept delivery with respect to all five orders because
Catron was not authorized to purchase common stock. (R. 196, 251).
This repudiation of the five contracts was transmitted to First
Equity approximately two weeks after USU had purchased, received,
accepted and paid for $445,050 worth of Fashion Fabric1s common
stock through the services of First Equity.(R. 99-149, 160-62).
Written confirmation of this decision by USU was given to First
Equity's Salt Lake City attorney on March 22, 1973* by hand delivered letter from Assistant Attorney General Madsen. (R. 330-31).
P.

First Equity1s Right to Compensation.

:;

An agent is entitled to his compensation when he completes
his undertaking, even though his principal received no benefit
therefrom.
,

Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 Po2d 237 (1954);

3 Am Jur 2d, Agency §§ 247 et seq.; 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers §§183,
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199 et seqp

First Equity's undertaking was based upon an oral

contract to purchase certain shares and to tender delivery to USU.
First Equity had purchased the shares in question and had tendered
delivery or had done all that was required of it to accomplish
delivery of the certificates to USU when USU repudiated the contracts,

All of the actions which were to be undertaken by the i

personnel of First Equity had been completed0

Therefore, First

Equity is entitled to compensation, in the form of commissions,
from USU, whether or not USU actually purchased the stock.
k

Under certain circumstances, an agent is also entitled to
indemnity from his principal for the damages the agent suffers
as a result of the performance of unlawful acts by the agent.

In

Horrabin v. Pes Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988 (1924), the
City of Des Moines employed Horrabin as its agent to build a
bridge and agreed to furnish the necessary rights-of-way,

x

Horrabin"

built the bridge where the City had directed, but the City failed
to obtain a necessary right-of-way.

The property owner brought an

action of trespass against the City and Horrabin and recovered
against Horrabin.

Horrabin then sought to have the City indemnify

him for losses suffered as a result of the trespass he had committed as the agent of the City.

The court held that since the

actions of Horrabin were not manifestly illegal, and were done in
the execution of his agency, the City should be required to indemni-
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fy him for losses suffered by reason of the trespass action.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the same principle in Hoggan
y0 Gaboon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903) in which the Court
quoted Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633, 638-39 (1855), to the
effect that indemnity will be allowed between an agent and his
principal:
where the act of the agent was not manifestly
illegal in itself, and was done bona fide in
the execution of his agency, and without knowledge (either actual or implied by law) that
it was illegal • . . .
26 Utah at 450, 73 P. at 514.
The actions of First Equity were clearly "done bona fide in
the execution11 of the oral brokerage contract.
common stock by First Equity on behalf of USU

The purchase of

fl

was not manifestly

illegal in itself11 because USU had been purchasing common stock
for some time and even the Attorney Generalfs office had concluded
that investment in common stock was not necessarily illegal. (R.
157, at 5).

Actual knowledge that USU had revoked Catronfs power

to authorize Appellant to purchase common stock, if such had in
fact occurred, was not transmitted to First Equity until after
First Equity had performed its contractual duties.

Constructive

knowledge that Catron had no authority cannot be implied by law to
First Equity because, according to the opinion letter issued by
the office of the Attorney General, Catron did have limited authori
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ty to invest in common stock.

Furthermore, USU had just completed

a purchase of over $400,000 worth of common stock through First
Equity.

Therefore, First Equity is entitled to be indemnified by

USU for losses it suffered in the resale of the shares of Advanced
Memory Systems.
E.

Constructive Knowledge of Insufficient Funds.

The factual issue of whether sufficient non-appropriated
funds were available is not relevant to any of the foregoing propositions, unless First Equity can be held to have had constructive
notice that the purchase contracts were ultra vires because no
authorized funds were available.

The Court below appears to have

held just that.
^ _ Practically, the burden imposed by such a ruling upon all
transactions between governmental entities and their private agents
would be insurmountable.

The agent would have to obtain some form

of a guarantee that the funds would be available when he had performed his part of the contract, such as having the money placed
in an escrow account.

Otherwise, the jjovernmental entity could turn

its back on the contract, as it has done in this case, and claim
"Ultra vires!11 by reason of insufficient funds. The Utah Supreme
Court has clearly not adopted any ruling which would uphold such a
position.
In Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764

-I/.-

(1919), a school district had contracted with an agent to build
a high school.

Sufficient funds to pay for the high school were

not available when the school was built; so, the school district
issued interest-bearing warrants payable on demand and at a specified time. The issuance of such warrants was not authorized by
statute and the interest payments were later disputed.
stated:

^

r ,r

There is no express provision in the
statutes of this state authorizing school
boards or other public corporations to
issue interest-bearing warrants» There is
a provision relating to interest on school
bonds issued after authority obtained from
the qualified electors of the several school
districts, and the rate of interest for such
indebtedness is that the bonds so issued
shall bear interest not exceeding five per
cent per annum, payable annually or semiannually. Manifestly that provision of the
statute does not relate to and does not
govern where the facts are as in this case.
It is further contended that the great
weight of authority, in the absence of express statutory provisions, is that warrants
issued by public corporations do not bear
interest.

In this action, as indicated, the debt
was due at the time the building was accepted. The school board was authorized to
contract to pay the debt at that date. We
are unable to understand why a public corporation should not be required to meet its
obligations the same as any other body authorized to contract debts, and upon a failure
to make payments at the time agreed why it
should not be required to pav interest for
* "*•*•*•• a any forbearance as an individual. [Emphasis
added].

The Court*

53 Utah at 350; 178 P. at 770.
Appellant urges this Court to find that the Lower Court erred
in holding that the amount of non-appropriated funds available to
USU for the purchase of common stock was a relevant issue of fact.
POINT IV
;--'•--' THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE 35-DAY MARGIN REQUIREMENT OF REGULATION T DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DEFENSE
TO FIRST EQUITY'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
A.

Reason for Appeal. -

"

^

First Equity's failure to deliver the order of Advanced
Memory Systems shares to USU within thirty-five days from
the date Catron placed the order

constituted a technical viola-

tion of Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. Part 220, promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board.

According to the Lower Court, this violation con-

stitutes a complete defense to First Equity's damage action based
upon those orders. (R. 435B).

The Lower Court reached this con-

clusion by finding that Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce., Fenner &
Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), represented "a proper ruling"
on the question. (R. 259). Appellant submits that the conclusion
of the Court below is in error because:

(1) Avery was not good law

at the time it was decided; (2) prior to the decision below, Congress
had effectively overruled Avery; and (3) the appellate courts which
have considered the question of an affirmative defense based upon
Regulation T have unanimously ruled that a technical violation of

. -36-

Regulation T does not constitute a complete defense to a broker's
action for damages#
Bo

Statutory Background0

Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act11), 15 U.S.C. §78g, provides in part: *
f

^
-

t:

(a) For the purpose of preventing
the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System shall, prior to the effective date
of this section and from time to time
thereafter, prescribe rules and regulations
with respect to the amount of credit that
may be initially extended and subsequently
maintained on any security (other than an
exempted security).

Such rules and regulations may make appropriate provision with respect to the carry, ing of . . . special or different margin ;
requirements for delayed deliveries . . . .

,

The primary legislative purpose for this section of the Exchange
Act "is to give a Government credit agency an effective method of
reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources
which can be diverted . . . into the stock market11.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).

H.R. REP. NO.

Congress also recognized

that a by-product of the main purpose would be protection of
"the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread
himself too thinly0fl [Emphasis added]* Jxl. '"•••
Section 7 of the Exchange Act also provided:
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-

(c) It shall be unlawful for any member
of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly,
,,x?: to extend or maintain credit . 0 .

*iol h ?

(1) on any security . . . in contravention
of the rules and regulations which the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall prescribe . . . .

^,

^

••?•, ID

Violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board subject a broker to disciplinary action by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

See 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(e)(2); Strath-

more SeCo, Inc. [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1(77,426 (S.E.C. 1966).

i;

J

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Federal Reserve
Board issued Regulation T, which states in relevant part:
^

General Rule (a)(1) Pursuant to this
section, a creditor may establish for any
customer one or more special accounts.

(c)(1) In a special cash account, a creditor may effect for or with any customer
bona fide cash transactions in securities i
in which the creditor may:
(i) Purchase any security for, or sell
any security to any customer, provided
. . . the purchase or sale is in reliance
upon an agreement accepted by the creditor
in good faith that the customer will promptly make full cash payment for the security
and that the customer does not contemplate
selling the security prior to making such
payment.
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(2) In case a customer purchases a
security 0 • . in the special cash account
and does not make full cash payment for the
security within 7 days after the date on
which the security is so purchased, the cre«ditor shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (3)-(7) of this paragraph, promptly
cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction
or the unsettled portion thereof.
•

• •

(5) If the creditor, acting in good faith
in accordance with subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph, purchases a security for a customer,
or sells a security to a customer, with the understanding that he is to deliver the security promptly to the customer, and the full cash payment to
be made against such delivery, the creditor may
at his option treat the transaction as one to
which the period applicable under subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph is not the 7 days therein
specified but 35 days after the date of such purchase or sale.
12 C.F.R. §220.4(a),(c).
Thus, a broker acting in good faith may purchase a security
into a special cash account for a customer who has agreed to promptly
make full cash payment for the security prior to selling the security • Under most circumstances, ^if the customer does not pay within
seven days of the purchase date, the broker must liquidate the
account.

However, to protect the customer from the economic dis-

advantage of purchasing a large block pf shares in a thin market,
Regulation T provides that delivery of the block of shares and payment therefor can be extended over a thirty-five day period.

If

delivery and payment are not accomplished within the thirty-five
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days, the account is to be liquidated.

See generally, Effros,

A Note on Regulation T, 82 BANKING L.J. 471 (1965).
Effective November 1, 1971, Section 7 of the Exchange Act
was amended, resulting in a reapportionment of the burden of
compliance with the margin rules.

Subsection (f) of Section 7

now reads in pertinent part:

^

t

(1) It is unlawful for any United States person . . . to obtain, receive, or enjoy the beneficial use of a loan or other extension of
credit from any lender . . . for the purpose of
(A) purchasing or carrying Unites States securities . . . if 0 . . the loan or other credit
transaction is prohibited.
A l s o effective November 1, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board issued
Regulation X , 12 C.F.R. Part 2 2 4 , which sets forth the rules
governing investors w h o obtain credit in securities transactions.
The relevant parts of Section 224.2(a) of Regulation X state:
A borrower shall not obtain a n y purpose
credit [i.e., credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities] . . . unless
he does so in compliance w i t h the following
conditions:

(2) Credit obtained from a broker/dealer
shall conform to the provisions of Part 2 2 0
(Regulation T ) , which is hereby incorporated in
this part (Regulation X ) . W h e n the term "broker/
dealer fl is used in this part (Regulation X ) , it
means a person w h o is a broker or dealer, including every member of a national securities
exchange, and includes a foreign branch or subsidiary of a broker/dealer.
-/. n .

Lastly, Section 29 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78cc, states
in pertinent part:
(b) Every contract made in violation of
any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a security on
an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made the
*•"""•*•' performance of which involves the violation of,
;
^
or the continuance of any relationship or prac- ^ ;
tice in violation of, any provision of this
title or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person
who, in violation of any such provision, rule,
-* •*-•
or regulation, shall have made or engaged in
the performance of any such contract, and (2)
c
as regards the rights of any person who, not
being a party to such contract, shall have acj
quired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making
or performance of such contract was in violation
of any such provision, rule, or regulation . . . .
'

-

Thus, on the face of the statute, a contract "made in violation
of" or "the performance of which constitutes the violation of"
Regulation T or Regulation X appears to be completely void.

The

courts, however, have refused to interpret Section 29(b) so broadly.
C.

Court Interpretations of Section 29(b).

Courts have dealt with Section 29(b) in two pertinent contexts:
:-^-v^ir)-where^a borrower brings a damage action to recover losses sustained by reason of the lender's violation of federal margin requirements; and (2) where a lender sues the borrower for losses and the
borrower asserts a violation of federal margin requirements as a
complete defense.

-41-

Prior to the enactment of Section 7(f) and the issuance of
Regulation X thereunder, the majority of courts deciding the scope
of Section 29(b), when the plaintiff borrower sought rescission
of the contract, held that contracts subject to that section were
not void but voidable.

See Gordon v. duPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc.

487 F. 2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1973);

Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon,

378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967);

Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,

312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962);

Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth,

332 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1972);

Aubin v. H. Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969);

Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969);
288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);

Moscarelli v. Stamm,

J. Cliff Rahel & Co. v. Roper,

186 Neb. 34, 180 N.W. 2d 682 (1970).

This interpretation received

Supreme Court approval in a case involving the violation of proxy
rules, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

The

Court concluded that a contract should be set aside under Section
29(b) "only if a court of equity concludes, from all the circumstances, that it would be equitable to do so." 396 U.S. at 388.
Shortly after the Mills decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals appeared to hold that a technical violation of Regulation
T resulted in the contract being void rather than voidable under
Section 29(b) despite the equities of the case. Pearlstein_Vj.
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Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).

However, the court

also noted that the investor did not contest his liability for the
original contract price nor his liability for losses incurred prior
to the time-limit violation. 429 F.2d at 1141 n.9.

Thus, the de-

cision only applied to the question of contract damages suffered
after the Regulation T violation.

In spite of this major limitation

on the Pearlstein conclusion, the court in Avery v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), cited Pearlstein as authority for the proposition that a Regulation T violation
by a broker automatically voids a sales contract under Section
29(b), thereby making the broker liable for all damages suffered
by an investor.

Since Avery was relied upon by the Court below,

it will be discussed in detail.
In Avery, a broker sold some stock short for a sophisticated
investor, but the investor did not have sufficient funds in her *
account to meet the margin requirements of Regulation T.

During

the following two weeks, the broker diligently attempted to obtain
the additional monies from the investor and, failing to do so, the
broker liquidated the investorfs short position at a loss to her of
over $8,000.

She then sued the broker to have the entire transac-

tion declared null and void and rescinded under Section 29(b)
because the broker violated the seven-day margin limit set by
Regulation :T.

The court found, as had a majority in Pearlstein,
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that Congress had placed the onus of compliance with the margin
requirements on brokers, and not on their customers.
at 680, citing Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1141.

328 F. Supp.

Since Congress had

placed the ultimate responsibility with brokers, the court refused to shift that burden to the customer and the transaction
was held to be null and void under Section 29(b). 328 F. Supp. at
680-81.

Nevertheless, the court expressed dissatisfaction with

the result:
The Court deplores this type of alleged
investor behavior and were not the mandate of Congress so unequivocal and the
public policy considerations to strong,
the Court might reach a substantially
different decision than the one it does.

x
^

328 F. Supp. at 681.
Although Pearlstein can be interpreted as consistent with
previous cases in light of the equitable apportionment of damages

x

which it accomplished, the result in Avery imposed all the damages

-

on the broker and did not take into account any defenses based
upon comparative fault or participatory behavior on the part of
^

- the

investor. Thus, Avery stands for a theory of strict liability

for violations of Regulation T.
Section 7(f) and Regulation X became effective shortly after
the decision in Avery,

Since that case turned entirely on the fact

that Congress had placed the onus of compliance solely on brokers,

it seems clear that the decision has been effectively overruled.
Investors are now equally responsible for compliance.
, .r>

In Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., Incr>,

-

- -

F. Supp. .. _ [Current

Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. K95,002 (S.t).N.Y. Mar. 5 f 1975), ,
the investors brought action against the broker for a minor margin
infraction that occurred long before the securities declined in
value.

The court noted that Section 7(f) and Regulation X under-

mine the approach to Section 29(b) taken by Pearlstein» and held
that a de minimis violation of Regulation T does not always support
a borrower's implied right of action.

Thus, the court not only

: . xefused to utilize a strict liability theory in connection with
,

Section 29(b), but granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because plaintiffs had alleged no claim upon which relief
could be granted.

It is clear that the strict liability theory

of Avery is not good law.
_.,.

___. rlo

e

,.>

„,....

-

date r .counsel far First Equity have found only three eases

, of record wherein courts have been required to interpret Section
29(b) in the context of the customer asserting, a brokerfs Regula:

, tion T violation as a defense. All three cases were decided prior
to the effective date of Section 7(f) and Regulation X.

-

In Staley v. Salvesen, 35 Pa.D. & C. 2d 318 (C.C. Phila. 1963),
a broker brought an action in assumpsit against his customer because
the broker had suffered a loss when the customer's special cash- —
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account was liquidated,.

The customer claimed that the brokerfs

violation of Regulation T was a complete defense and the trial
-„ courtruled that the brokerfs violation automatically voided the
contract under Section 29(b).

—

The case was not appealed.

Billings Associates, Inc. v. Bashaw« 27 App. Div. 2d 124,
276 N.Y.S. 2d 446 (4th Depft 1967), involved a purchase of stock
by a broker pursuant to the investorfs oral stock purchase order.
The customer failed to pay within the seven-day period prescribed
by Regulation T and the broker waited nearly one month before
liquidating the account.

The brokerfs suit to recover the liqui-

^
L:

,:--:—:> dation deficiency was^ dismissed by the trial court, but the appellate ^
court reversed, holding that Section 29(b) only voids those contracts
which by their terms actually violate the Exchange Act and Regulation
T*

The court stated that the broker was entitled to damages based

upon the investorfs breach, but it refused to allow the broker to
benefit by its violation of Regulation T.

Therefore, damages were

limited to the difference between the purchase price of the shares
and the highest market price between the date the account should
have been liquidated and the date of sale by the broker.

(Signifi-

cantly, JPea£l£tein cites Billings Associates with approval when it
discusses the question of the equitable apportionment of damages.
See

429 F.2d at 1141 n.9.)
The second appellate decision which interpreted Section 29(b)
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?

in the"context of a Regulation T defense was Gregory-Massari, Inc.
v. Purkitt, 1 Cal.App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969).

The facts

were the same as in the other two cases and the broker sued to recover the liquidation deficiency.

The broker relied on Billings

Associates and the investor relied on Staley; the court agreed with
the interpretation given to Section 29(b) in Billings Associates
and pointed out that the trial judge in Staley erroneously ruled
on the basAs of her paraphrase of Section 29(b).

The measure of --

damages adopted by the court was the same as that adopted in Billings
Associates and Pearlstein.
Thus, it appears clear that the decision of the Lower Court,
to the effect that a Regulation T violation constitutes a complete
defense to an action for damages, is erroneous. The oral contracts
entered into between First Equity and USU did not by their terms
actually violate Regulation T and, therefore, Appellant petitions
—

the Court to find that the Lower Court erred in denying Appellant's "
Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground.
D.

Limitation on Damages.

7

PearIstein, Gregory-Mas sari, and Billings Associates apportioned
losses between the broker and the investor.

Basically, any losses

incurred prior to the violation of Regulation T were to be borne by
the investor and any losses suffered as a result of the Regulation
T violation were to be borne by the broker. This ruling was brought
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to the attention of the Lower Court and First Equity stipulated
to reduce the damages sought on its Motion for Summary Judgment
accordingly. (R. 424-25).

Thus, First Equityfs claim for damages

as a result of losses on the resale of the Advanced Memory Systems
stock has been reduced from $37,045.27 to $15,625.00 and First
Equity will suffer a non-recoverable loss of $21,420.27 as a result
of its violation of Regulation T.

USU does not dispute the figures

used by Appellant to arrive at the aforementioned amounts. (R. 443).
CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment of the Lower Court cannot be justified
unless this Court were to hold:
1.

That the explicit Legislative grants of power to USU to
purchase, hold and sell all forms of personal property,
to convert private donations into other forms of property,
and to invest such property were wholly insufficient to
give USU the power to invest in common stock, or

2.

That even though USU may have been granted power to invest
in common stock, the enactment of Section 33-1-1 of the
Utah Code, in 1939, thereafter prohibited USU and any
other private corporation or person from investing lawfully in common stock, or

3.

That notwithstanding the fact that USU was authorized to
invest certain non-appropriated funds in its custody in
common stock, the Lower Court could ignore this in granting Summary Judgment in favor of USU.

The denial of First Equityfs Motion for Summary Judgment cannot
be justified unless this Court were to hold:
1.

That the agent of a governmental entity is on constructive
notice that his contract is ultra vires any time that the
entity does not have sufficient authorized funds to meet
its contract obligations, or

2.

That a sophisticated institutional investor may absolutely avoid a contract with its broker whenever that
broker inadvertantly violates the time-limit requirements of Regulation T, notwithstanding the fact that
the investor utilized the particular broker so as to
obtain cash-flow benefits resulting from the delays
inherent in dealing with a broker over 2,000 miles
away.

Appellant contends that the bases of the Lower Court's rulings
are not sound and that the Orders should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN

By:

Norman S. Johnson
Randall P. Spackman
- Christine M. Durham
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